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CLEARING THE WAY FOR AN EFFECTIVE FEDERAL-STATE
PARTNERSHIP IN HEALTH REFORM
Eleanor D. Kinney*
At century's end, states have assumed a very different role in the design,
implementation, and operation of health service programs than they did twenty-
five years ago. In the current volatile political atmosphere particularly at the
federal level, states have taken up the mantel of healthcare reform in the final
years of the 1990s. Yet there remain problems and difficulties with the current
federal-state relationship in health reform. The critical question is whether states
can successfully accomplish genuine reform given its politically charged, complex
and costly nature. This question takes on particular significance for the most
important reform-expanding coverage to the uninsured poor.
This Article explores the contours of a federal-state partnership that will move to-
ward the societal goal of universal health coverage, and especially coverage of the
uninsured poor. The Article suggests several legislative and regulatory changes.
The most practical and immediate steps that Congress could take are to reform the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1973 (ERISA) and provide match-
ing funds for state health insurance programs for the uninsured that allow states
great flexibility in designing programs that really reach the uninsured within their
boundaries.
INTRODUCTION
At century's end, states have assumed a very different role in the
design, implementation, and operation of health service programs
than they had twenty-five years ago. The Washington Post accurately
captured today's state of affairs in its October 10, 1998 headline,
the day after health reform legislation failed yet again in the
United States Congress. The national section headline read:
"Senate Kills 'Patients' Rights' Bill: Managed-Care Measure a
Victim of Partisanship, Clinton Scandal, Lobbying."' Referring to
the respective positions on health reform of the gubernatorial
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1. Amy Goldstein & Helen Dewar, Senate Kills 'Patients' Rights' Bill: Managed-Care Meas-
ure a Victim of Partisanship, Clinton Scandal, Lobbying, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1998, at Al.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
candidates in the Maryland election, the metro section headline
read: "Doctors Backing Sauerbrey as Glendening Lines Up
HMOs."2
These headlines are revealing. At the national level, a modest
proposal for procedural protections for health plan consumers
failed in Congress-a victim of partisan politics, special interests
and Presidential scandal. In this volatile political atmosphere, par-
ticularly at the federal level, states have taken up the mantel of
health care reform in the final years of the 1990s. The critical ques-
tion is whether states can successfully accomplish genuine reform
given its politically charged, complex, and costly nature. This ques-
tion takes on particular significance for the most important
reform: expanding coverage to the uninsured poor.
Today, the American health sector is in need of reform for two
reasons. First, forty-three million Americans (16.1%) have no
health coverage.3 Second, serious inflation plagues the health care
sector. Health care expenditures have risen from 73.2 billion dol-
lars in 1970 to one trillion dollars in 19964 and are estimated to
reach over two trillion dollars in 2007.5 For the last thirty-five years,
states and the federal government have grappled with these prob-
lems and continue to do so today with varying degrees of success.
The relationship between states and the federal government
changed dramatically in the last fifty years. At mid-century, neither
the federal government nor the states had direct responsibility for
the financing or delivery of health care services. The federal gov-
ernment had a very limited role in the health care sector with
support for a very small federal-state medical assistance program
for welfare recipients, a small federal public health program, and a
nascent biomedical research effort that would subsequently fuel
dramatic medical advances and transform the American health
care sector.6 Union pressure for coverage through the workplace
and a general demand for health coverage among the middle class
2. Avram Goldstein & Scott Wilson, Doctors Backing Sauerbrey as Glendening Lines Up
HMOs, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1998, at B1.
3. See U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage: 1997 thl. 1 (last modified Feb. 3,
1999) <http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/hlthin97/> (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
4. See Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv-
ices, National Health Care Expenditures Projections Tables tbl. 1 (last modified Mar. 28, 1998)
<http://www.hcfa.gov> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
5. See Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv-
ices, Highlights of the National Health Expenditures Projections, 1997-2007 (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.hcfa.gov> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).




led to the expansion of private health insurance coverage in the
middle of the twentieth century.7 Historically, states have had
dominant responsibility for regulating the commercial insurance
industry as well as addressing the needs of the poor.
The federal government assumed a more dominant role in fi-
nancing and regulating health care services with the enactment of
the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965. By the mid-1970s,
the nation was moving toward national health insurance with a
minimal state role.9 As with many other domestic problems,' the
federal government in the 1960s played a greater role in address-
ing problems such as providing health insurance coverage for
underserved groups and alleviating poverty." The widely held lib-
eral view that many states, particularly southern states with a history
of racial segregation, were unreliable in addressing the problems
of the poor partly shaped the federal expansion in domestic pro-
gramming. Following the federal activism of the 1960s and 1970s,
many commentators on federalism asserted that states were virtu-
ally irrelevant in addressing many social problems.' 3
Beginning with President Nixon, presidential administrations
have sought to reinvigorate the role of states in solving domestic'4
problems. President Reagan's brand of federalism was not so
7. See id. at 310-34.
8. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
9. See generally SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESOURCE BOOK (rev. ed. 1976) (presenting proposals for
national health insurance); KAREN DAVIS, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: BENEFITS, COSTS,
AND CONSEQUENCES (1975) (presenting an examination of the costs and benefits associated
with various national health insurance proposals by the chief architect of the Carter Admini-
stration's national health insurance proposal); NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: WHAT Now,
WHAT LATER, WHAT NEVER? (Mark V. Pauly ed., 1980) (presenting arguments for and
against national health insurance).
10. See generally ANN O'M. BOWMAN & RICHARD C. KEARNEY, THE RESURGENCE OF THE
STATES 5-22 (1986) (describing a period of increased federal authority); DAVID B. WALKER,
THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON 92-150 (1995) (discussing
the evolution of federalism and the role of federal aid programs therein).
11. See generally KAREN DAVIS & CATHY SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY: A
TEN-YEAR APPRAISAL (1978) (discussing the Medicare and Medicaid programs and their
impact on the poor).
12. SeeDANIELJ. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 10-25 (3d
ed. 1984) (providing an excellent description of the differences in the "civil societies" of
states at mid-century that precipitated these concerns).
13. But see Malcolm E. Jewell, The Neglected World of State Politics, 44J. POL. 638, 638-57
(1982) (discussing states' "growing importance" and the need for academics to take states
seriously), cited in Howard M. Leichter, The States and Healthcare Policy: Taking the Lead, in
HEALTH POLICY REFORM IN AMERICA: INNOVATIONS FROM THE STATES 3, 3 n.1 (Howard M.
Leichter ed., 1992).
14. See WALKER, supra note 10, at 129-70. See generally TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDER-
ALISM: INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN (1988) (describing the
history of state-federal relations since the 1960s); THE STATE OF THE STATES (Carl E. Van
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much an allocation of power in solving domestic problems as a re-
duction in governmental responsibility generally, particularly with
respect to the federal government. 15 President Bush paid little at-
tention to federalism issues but generally followed the approaches
of the Reagan administration.16 President Clinton, a former gover-
nor with a deep interest in domestic policy issues including health
reform, brought a new approach to federalism which has allowed
for real state progress in the area of health reform and, in particu-
lar, coverage expansion for the low-income poor. 17 The earlier
vision of states, in general, being incapable of sustained social re-
form is waning with the emergence of evidence of states'
capabilities in governance since the 1960s.is
This Article examines the experience of states in attempting to
expand health insurance coverage to their uninsured poor and, in
particular, the states' relationship with the federal government in
this effort. Part I examines the current status of the state-federal
health care relationship including the health of the general popu-
lation, care for low-income persons, and the regulation of private
health insurance. To elucidate the issues facing states, Part II ex-
plores the experience of Indiana in developing strategies to
enhance coverage for low-income workers and their families. In so
doing, the Article concretely describes the barriers and opportuni-
ties for states as they endeavor to expand coverage for low-income
uninsured. The Article concludes that most states are not capable
of significant coverage expansions without federal financial contri-
bution and mandates for consumer protection. The Article
suggests a reformed relationship between states and the federal
government that empowers states to expand coverage for the unin-
sured poor and facilitates state innovation and leadership in that
effort.
Horn ed., 1989) (assessing the performance of state government after the expansion of
states' rights in the 1980s and crediting President Reagan for facilitating greater state re-
sponsibility for solving domestic problems).
15. See WALKER, supra note 10, at 152-62; Robert F. Rich & William D. White, Federalism
and Healthcare, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 861, 862-63. See generally THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN
EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
(John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawbill eds., 1982) (describing changes in federal social welfare
policy in the Reagan administration).
16. SeeWALKER, supra note 10, at 162-68.
17. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
18. See generally BOWMAN & KEARNEY, supra note 10; IRA SHARKANSKY, THE MALIGNED
STATES: POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROBLEMS, AND OPPORTUNITIES (1972) (articulating
the emerging opinion about the capabilities of states); Mavis Mann Reeves, The States as
Polities: Reformed, Reinvigorated, Resourceful, ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi., May 1990, at
83 (discussing the states' increased vitality).
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I. THE CURRENT STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
IN HEALTH COVERAGE
Four events have shaped the nature and scope of health cover-
age in the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century.
First, post-World War II employers began providing health insur-
ance as a fringe benefit to union workers in lieu of wages during a
period of wage-price controls. Employer-sponsored health insur-
ance grew dramatically, the predominant source of health coverage
for non-elderly Americans. Second, in 1965 Congress enacted the
Medicaid program, which provided that the federal government
and states would fund health coverage for welfare program partici-
pants under the Social Security Act. 0 Third, in 1974 Congress
enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
21
which located regulation of employer-sponsored health insur-
ance-the predominant source of health insurance for the
nonelderly-in the federal government and a step removed from22
state insurance regulation. Finally, in 1997, Congress established
the Children's Health Insurance Program as a joint federal-state
program to provide coverage for all low-income children.23
A. Health Coverage of the American Population
Currently, Americans are enrolled in a mix of health plans
24
with multiple public and private sponsors. Within the general
categories of public and private insurance are markedly different
health plan sponsors. Public sponsors include the federal gov-
ernment, states, and both acting together. Private sponsors
include employers, commercial insurance companies, and man-
aged care organizations (MCOs), including health maintenance
19. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Healthcare Coverage and Costs: Historical Develop-
ment and Choices for the 1990's, 21J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 145 (1993).
20. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994)).
21. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 503, 88
Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453 (1994)). For an introductory dis-
cussion of ERISA, see infra Part I.C.2.
22. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
24. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 19, at 153.
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organizations (HMOs). Private plans of these different sponsors, as
described below, are subject to different regulatory regimes.25
In 1997, about 225 million Americans (83.9% of the population)
were enrolled in some type of public or private health plan.26 Most
non-elderly Americans obtain health insurance through their own
employment or the employment of a family member. An estimated
sixty-one percent of non-elderly Americans have coverage through
27employer-sponsored health insurance. In 1997, 35.5 million
Americans had health insurance through the federal Medicare
program for the elderly and severely disabled and 28.9 million
through the federal-state Medicaid program for some poor.2S In
1996, children under age twenty-one and adults in families with
dependent children comprised sixty-six percent of all Medicaid
29
beneficiaries.
Forty-three million Americans had no health coverage in 1997. °
This number grew by 1.7 million between 1996 and 1997 alone,
leaving 16.1% of the population uninsured 3-a disturbing trend
given the strong performance of the American economy in the
1990s. Who is uninsured and for how long has been studied
extensively in recent years. The largest group of uninsured are
low-income workers.33 In a December 1997 poll, more than half of
adults in low-income working families (under $35,000 annual
25. See infra notes 104-30 and accompanying text.
26. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3.
27. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH IN-
SURANCE DATA, 1997-1998, at 21 fig.2.6 (1998).
28. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3. Cf Health Care Financing Administration,
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Statistics: Populations tbls.1, 11 (last modified Apr. 22,
1997) <http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/hstats96/blustats.htm> (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform) (estimating that in 1997 38.6 million Americans obtained
insurance through Medicare and 38.7 million through Medicaid).
29. See Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv-
ices, Medicaid Professional/Technical Information tbl.3 (last modified Jan. 21, 1998)
<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/2082-3.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
30. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3. See generally JOEL S. WEISSMAN & ARNOLD M.
EPSTEIN, FALLING THROUGH THE SAFETY NET: INSURANCE STATUS AND ACCESS TO HEALTH-
CARE (1994) (describing the problems that the uninsured poor have in getting health care).
31. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3; U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Cover-
age: 1996 (last modified Feb. 3, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/cover96/
c96tabb.html> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
32. See generally LINDA J. BLUMBERG & DAVID W. LISKA, THE UNINSURED IN THE
UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT (1996) (presenting data on characteristics of the unin-
sured and trends in uninsurance in the United States in the 1990s); Olveen Carrasquillo et
al., Going Bare: Trends in Health Insurance Coverage, 1989 Through 1996, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
36 (1999) (same); Karen Davis et al., Health Insurance: The Size and Shape of the Problem, 32
INQUIRY 196 (1995).
33. See BLUMBERG & LIsKA, supra note 32, at 6.
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income) reported having been uninsured some time during the
34last two years.
There is also evidence that the problem of uninsurance is
getting worse as sponsors of health coverage reduce benefits, fail to
provide affordable coverage, or provide no coverage at all.
Specifically, employer-s ponsored health coverage, particularly for
families, has declined. The rate of employer coverage fell by six• 36
percentage points between 1988 and 1993. Research suggests that
cost sharing and benefit limits have increased in recent years in
many private health insurance plans and that many employees
decline to take up private health insurance coverage even when
37offered because of the cost. Increasingly, employers are
purchasing coverage from HMOs and other MCOs and offering
employees prepaid managed care plans. As of 1995, about seventy-
five percent of participants in employer-sponsored plans were
enrolled in some kind of managed care plan•3 While beyond the
scope of this Article to address fully, some evidence suggests that
employer-sponsored health coverage may not ultimately be the
best or most appropriate vehicle for providing health coverage to
the non-elderly population.39 Some have even suggested that it is
not 'just" as a philosophical matter.40
34. See CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & COMMON-
WEALTH FUND, WORKING FAMILIES AT RISK: COVERAGE, ACCESS, COST, AND WORRIES 2
(1998).
35. See BLUMBERG & LISKA, supra note 32, at 2; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 19, at 155. See
generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-97-35, EMPLOYMENT-BASED
HEALTH INSURANCE: COSTS INCREASE AND FAMILY COVERAGE DECREASES (1997) (describing
trends in employer-sponsored coverage).
36. See BLUMBERG & LISKA, supra note 32, at 2.
37. See Michael Chernew et al., The Demand for Health Insurance Coverage by Low-Income
Workers: Can Reduced Premiums Achieve Full Coverage?, 32 HSR: HEALTH SERVICES RES. 453, 461
(1997); Philip Cooper & Barbara Steinberg Schone, More Offers, Fewer Takers for Employment-
Based Health Insurance: 1987 and 1996, HEALTH As'F., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 142, 147; Paul B.
Ginsburg et al., Tracking Small-Firm Coverage, 1989-1996, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1998, at
167, 170; M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Worker Demand for Health Insurance in the
Non-Group Market, 14J. HEALTH ECON. 47, 61 (1995).
38. See Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the
1990s, HEALTH AFF.Jan./Feb. 1997, at 125, 125.
39. See generally Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between Wages and
Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REV 1421 (1993) (describing the flaws in distributive devices that fail to
provide universal coverage and fail to reward the most productive citizens).
40. See generally Nancy S. Jecker, Can an Employer-based Health Insurance System Be Just,
18J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 657 (1993) (presenting the argument that employer-based
health insurance system is inherently unjust); David A. Rochefort, The Pragmatic Appeal of
Employment-Based Healthcare Reform, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 683 (1993) (offering
comments and perspectives on employment-health insurance coverage); Joan E. Rutten-
berg, Revising the Employment-Insurance Link 18J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 675 (1993).
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Finally, there are also marked disparities in insurance coverage
among states. The percent of non-elderly uninsured varies from a
low of seven percent in Tennessee to a high of twenty-six percent
in New Mexico.' The variation in health coverage is due partly to
the extent of Medicaid coverage in the states as well as other avail-
able insurance options. While the Medicaid coverage nationwide
was twelve percent in 1994-1995, 42 Medicaid coverage ranged from
six percent in Colorado to twenty-one percent in Tennesee 43-a
state with a section 1115 Medicaid waiver to support a statewide
health insurance program for the uninsured.4
B. Health Insurance Programs for the Poor
Historically, states have had the obligation to care for the poor.
Such state assistance was targeted to the so-called deserving poor-
poor persons who, through no fault of their own, were unable to
provide adequately for themselves.45 As medicine advanced in the
nineteenth century, this obligation to the poor began to include
some medical care as well.
46
In 1935, Congress enacted the Social Security Act4-a pillar of
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and his enduring response to the
catastrophic economic dislocations of the Great Depression. The
Act contained several cash assistance programs for different cate-
gories of poor, including the aged,48 blind,49 disabled , and families
with dependent children, 5' who were ostensibly in dire straights
through no fault of their own. Designed as state programs, these
cash assistance programs included federal requirements that states
were obligated to meet to obtain federal matching funds. Despite
considerable support from Presidents Roosevelt and Truman for
41. See DAVID W. LiSKA ET AL., STATE-LEVEL DATABOOK ON HEALTHCARE ACCESS AND
FINANCING 6, 12-13 (3d ed. 1998).
42. See id. at 12.
43. See id. at 12-13.
44. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
45. See William P. Quigley, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Mille-
nium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL'v REV. 101,103 (1998).
46. See David Rosner, Healthcare for the "Truly Needy": Nineteenth-Century Origins of the
Concept, 60 MILBANK MEM'L FUND Q. HEALTH & SOC'Y 355, 369 (1982).
47. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-
1399 (1994)).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 302 (1994) (repealed 1972).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1206 (1994) (repealed 1972).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1994).
51. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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incorporating national health insurance into the Social Security
framework, it was not until the 1950s that Congress began to estab-
lish a limited medical benefit to welfare programs under the Social
Security Act.52 In the 1960s, using the same state-federal model of
other Social Security Act welfare programs, Congress enacted the
Kerr-Mills Act, which provided limited health benefits for the eld-
erly poor.53 The Medical Assistance program under the Kerr-Mills
54Act was the model for the 1965 Medicaid program.
1. The Medicaid Program-In 1965, Congress enacted the Medi-
caid and Medicare programs to meet the health insurance needs of
the elderly and the poor on cash assistance programs under the
Social Security Act.55 The Medicaid program is jointly financed and
administered by the federal government and the states. 56 State par-
ticipation in the program is optional, but in order to participate,
states must submit a "state plan" to the federal government describ-
ing the state program and providing assurances on how the state
will meet federal requirements for mandatory and optional com-
ponents of the program.57 The federal government matches state
dollars expended on the Medicaid program, but at different rates
depending on the state's relative per capita income. The federal
match comes from federal general revenues 9 and the state contri-
bution usually comes from state general revenues.60 In fiscal year
1997, the federal government paid about fifty-seven percent of to-tal edicid • 61
tal Medicaid expenditures.
a. Eligibility-Historically, Medicaid eligibility has been linked
to eligibility for the two major cash assistance programs under the
Social Security Act-the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
52. See ROBERTJ. MYERS, MEDICARE 39 (1970).
53. Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924 (repealed
1965); see also MYERS, supra note 52, at 39-40.
54. See MYERS, supra note 52, at 286-306.
55. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994) (Medicare) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994)
(Medicaid)).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2) (1994).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (1998).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 430.20 (1998).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994); see also HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PROGRAM STATISTICS: ANALYSIS OF STATE
MEDICAID PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS, 1986, at 119 tbl.67 (1987).
60. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, STATE MEDICAID MANUAL (1999).
61. See Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services,
Brief Summaries of Medicare & Medicaid: Title XVIII and Title X1X of the Social Security Act (last modi-
fiedJune 25, 1998) <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicare/oremedmed.htm#medicaid> (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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(AFDC) 62 and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.
6
1
Since the program's inception, Congress has repeatedly changed
eligibility requirements and added additional Medicaid eligible
participants to address specific needs.64
States are also given the option of covering the medically
needy,65 individuals who, except for their income or resources,
meet the eligibility requirements for SSI or AFDC. 66 The medically
needy program offers catastrophic health and long term care in-
surance for lower income people who must "spend down" their
income and resources to obtain Medicaid eligibility. Seventy per-
67cent of states have a medically needy program. Most of the states
without such programs are in the South and Southwest. 6'
In 1983, following the Reagan administration's sharp cuts in all
programs for the poor,69 Congress began to expand Medicaid eli-
gibility for infants, children, and pregnant mothers.70 The upshot
of this effort was that by April 1990 all states had to cover all poor
children (born after 1983 up to age eighteen) with family incomes
less than 133% of the poverty level.7 ' Thus, by 2002, all poor chil-
dren under age nineteen will be covered. One important group of
the optional categorically needy are children under age seven born
after 1983 and pregnant women whose incomes are under 185% of
72the federal poverty level. This eligibility expansion is a major de-
parture from basing eligibility on state standards for categorical
assistance programs, and thus represents a significant step toward
treating similarly situated poor in different states in a uniform
manner.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1994), repealed by Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a) (1), 110 Stat. 2112.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1994).
64. These eligibility expansions are numerous and have highly technical qualification re-
quirements. The best description of these eligibility expansions and the statutory and regulatory
authority on which they are based is contained in 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
14,211-381 (Apr. 9, 1998). See also CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., 103D CONG., lST SESS.,
MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS, 1993 UPDATE 187 (1993)
[hereinafter MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK].
65. See42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10)(C) (1994).
66. See id.
67. See Medicaid State Plan Summaries, 4 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 15,550-
660 (1999).
68. See id.
69. See generally John K. Iglehart, Federal Policies and the Poor, 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 836
(1982) (discussing the Reagan administration's policies toward the poor).
70. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making Under the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to
Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 855, 866 (1990).
71. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6401, 103 Stat.
2258-59 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (1994)).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (ii) (1994).
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In the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996, Congress fundamentally reformed the
American cash assistance program for low-income mothers and
children and specifically terminated the AFDC program and itsS 74
ongoing cash assistance. In its place, the Act substitutes capped
block grants for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). 75
TANF requires recipients to participate in community service after
two months of benefits76 and to return to work, as defined by the
state, after two years of benefits.7 7
This new statute also changed the eligibility rules for Medicaid
for former AFDC recipients. States are required to provide Medi-
caid coverage and benefits to children and parents who otherwise
would be eligible for AFDC. The TANF program does not affect
Medicaid eligibility for children and pregnant women in families
with incomes under 133% of the poverty level who are independ-
ently eligible for Medicaid.79 Also, some poor children are eligible
for the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) described
below.
8 0
b. Benefits and Coverage--The federal Medicaid statute specifies
the benefits that state programs must include to qualify for federal
matching funds"' and identifies s pecific additional benefits that• . 82
states have the option of covering. States have greater flexibility in
structuring the benefit packages for their medically needy pro-
grams, although any medically needy program must include
prenatal and delivery care for pregnant women, and other speci-
fied services.8 3
73. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1998)).
74. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1998)).
75. See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 110
Stat. at 2105; CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., WELFARE REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR FED-
ERAL/STATE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS (1996) (providing a general description of the new
program); Sherwood K. Zink & Howard Bernstein, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opporlu-
nity Reconciliation Act: Introducing the New Welfare Law, GP SOLO & SMALL FIRM LAw., July/Aug.
1998, at 49 (same); Welcome to the Office of Family Assistance Home Page (visited Mar. 16, 1999)
<http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/progrms/ofa/> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (B) (iv) (Supp. III 1997).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (A) (ii) (Supp. III 1997).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (Supp. III 1997).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. III 1997).
80. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
81. See42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A) (1994).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(25) (1994).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (c) (iii) (1994).
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Coverage provided must be "sufficient in amount, duration, and
scope to achieve [the services'] purpose. "84 To insure that states do
not unduly favor one group of Medicaid eligibles over another,
there are limits on the degree to which states can provide coverage
of benefits for some groups of Medicaid eligibles and not for oth-
ers. 8 In addition, states cannot arbitrarily discriminate in benefit
coverage for mandatory services on the basis of diagnosis, type of
illness, or condition.86 As a result of these flexible rules, coverage of
both mandated and optional Medicaid benefits varies considerably
87among states.
c. Waivers of Federal Requirements-Waivers play an important
role in the Medicaid program by permitting states both to experi-
ment with different approaches to financing and delivering health
care services and to meet the particular needs of special groups of
beneficiaries. Two waivers in particular have been especially impor-
tant with respect to coverage for the uninsured poor. The waiver
authority for primary care case management systems, established in
1981, has enabled states to bring Medicaid eligibles into managed
care plans with savings to the program and enhanced care to re-
89
cipients. In 1997, Congress authorized states to serve Medicaid
beneficiaries through prepaid managed care plans without getting
a waiver of program requirements. 
9
0
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i) (1994).
85. Specifically, coverage for all groups of categorically needy must be equal in amount,
duration, and scope, and at least equivalent to coverage for the medically needy. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(B)(ii) (1994). Similarly, coverage of services within each group of medically
needy must also be equal in amount, duration, and scope except where otherwise authorized by
regulation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (B) (i) (1994). Coverage of services provided by HMOs
must be of comparable amount, duration, and scope as non-HMO services. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396b(m) (1) (A) (i) (1994).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 435.100-170 (1998).
87. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 1.
88. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2175, 95 Stat.
357,809-11 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (1994)).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b)(1) (1994). See genera/!y RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & JOHN
HOLAHAN, MEDICAID IN THE REAGAN ERA: FEDERAL POLICY AND STATE CHOICES (1982)
(describing changes to the Medicaid program initiated in the Reagan administration); ROBERT
E. HURLEY ET AL., MANAGED CARE IN MEDICAID: LESSONS FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM DESIGN
(1993) (describing Medicaid Managed Care under various waiver authorities in the 1980s);
MICHAEL S. SPARER, MEDICAID AND THE LIMITS OF STATE HEALTH REFORM (1996) (describing
Medicaid changes under Reagan); Deborah A. Freund & Edward Neuschler, Overview of
Medicaid Competition and Case Management Initiatives, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv., Ann. Supp.
1986, at 21; Robert E. Hurley, Status of the Medicaid Competition Demonstrations, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REv., Winter 1986, at 65.
90. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4702, 111 Stat. 251, 494-95
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 (1998)); Medicaid Program, Medicaid Man-




Since the beginning of the Clinton administration, which loos-
ened requirements for experimental waivers for state Medicaid
programs,9 ' many states have used waivers under section 1115 of
the Social Security Act 9' to expand coverage for low-income unin-
sured, including workers, who did not otherwise meet Medicaid
eligibility requirements. The Clinton administration policy per-
mits states to include all uninsured poor in prepaid managed care
plans so long as the programs are budget neutral.94 As of 1999, fif-
teen states had implemented health insurance programs for the
uninsured poor under section 1115 waivers and several more are in
95the process of applying and implementing such programs.
2. The Children's Health Insurance Program-The Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 established the State Children's Health
Insurance Program (CHIP)9 6 which provides $24 billion in
matching funds to states for five years to expand health insuranceS 97
coverage for children. States can enroll all children for funding
up to 200% of poverty.98 In addition, states can enroll the
91. See Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv-
ices, State Welfare Demonstrations, June 1995 (last modified June 30, 1996) <http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter HCFA, State Welfare Demonstrations].
92. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, sec. 122, § 1115, 76 Stat.
172, 192 (amending Social Security Act) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994)).
93. See HCFA, State Welfare Demonstrations, supra note 91; see also Lisa Axelrod, The Trend
Toward Medicaid Managed Care: Is the Government Selling Out the Medicaid Poor, 7 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 251 (1998) (describing new state programs to cover the uninsured poor under section 1115
waivers for Medicaid);John Holahan et al., Insuring the Poor Through Section 1115 Medicaid Waiv-
en, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 199 (same); Judith M. Rosenberg & David T. Zaring,
Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115 and State Healthcare Reform, 32 HARV. J. LEGis. 545
(1995) (same); Note, The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, 110 HARv. L. Riv.
751 (1997) (same).
94. See Holahan et al., supra note 93, at 200.
95. See Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services,
Comprehensive State Health Reform Demonstrations (last modified Feb. 17, 1999)
<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/ord-1 15.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
96. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4901(a), 111 Stat. 271, 552
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (1998)).
97. See generally BRIAN K BRUEN AND FRANK ULLMAN, CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE
PROGRAMS: WHERE STATES ARE, WHERE THEY ARE HEADED (1998) (describing the new CHIP
program); Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services,
Children's Health Insurance Program (last modified Aug. 5, 1999), <http://www.hcfa.gov/
init/children.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Sarah Ro-
senbaum et al., The Children's Hour: The State Children's Health Insurance Program, HEALTH AFF.,
Jan./Feb. 1998, at 75, 77; Allison Cendali, Comment, Implementation of the Children's Health Insur-
ance Program: HHS, States, and Lessons for National Health Reform, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 659 (1998).
98. See Balanced Budget Act, §4901(a), 111 Stat. at 553 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1397bb(a) (1998)); see also Families USA Foundation, Welfare-Medicaid Links (last modified
Oct. 29, 1999) <http://www.familiesusa.org/whatwelf.htm> (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
SUMMER 19991
University of Michigan Journal of Law ReformV
children's parents if they meet certain fiscal constraints.9 The
legislation does not create an entitlement program such as
Medicaid for children but rather gives states the opportunity to
inaugurate programs to expand health insurance coverage for
children. 00 They can expand their Medicaid programs to include
covered children' °1 or they can establish independent programs. 1°'
With the latter option, states have greater flexibility, although
benefit packages must be comparable to benchmark plans such as
the standard Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan for federal
employees, the state's health plan for state employees, or the
commercial HMO having the largest enrollment in the state. 
°
0
C. The Regulation of Private Health Insurance
As indicated above, private health insurance finances the health
care of most Americans-particularly non-elderly working Ameri-104
cans. Government's role has been to regulate private health
insurance to ensure that adequate and affordable health coverage
is available to all who wish to purchase it-a goal yet to be
achieved. 05
1. State Regulation of Health Insurance-States historically have
regulated insurance and they continue to do so under the unique
allocation of federal and state supervision of insurance that
Congress established in the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act. 10 6 State
insurance regulation addresses insurer solvency and market107
conduct with respect to consumers. With respect to the
regulation of solvency, most states regulate rates to ensure that
99. See Balanced Budget Act, § 4901 (a), 111 Stat. at 562 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(3) (1998)). See generally Kenneth E. Thorpe & Curtis S. Florence, Cover-
ing Uninsured Children and Their Parents: Estimated Costs and Numbers of Newly Insured, 56 MED.
CARE RES. & REv. 197 (1999) (describing the process and cost of including parents in state
CHIP programs).
100. See Balanced Budget Act, § 4901 (a), 111 Stat. at 552 (codified as amended at 42




104. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
106. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1014 (1994)).
107. SeeJOHN G. DAY, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSUR-
ANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1970); KATHLEEN HEALD ETrLINGER ET AL., INSURANCE
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, STATE INSURANCE REGULATION 3-5 (1995).
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they are adequate to maintain insurer solvency but not excessive.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a
non-profit organization comprised of state and territorial
insurance commissioners, effectively coordinates insurance
regulation among the states through model laws and regulations
and provides common services and technical assistance to state
insurance departments.
108
This arrangement of state regulators coordinating regulatory
programs through a private organization is unique. In virtually all
other areas where national uniformity or consistency is perceived
to be necessary, Congress has established federal regulatory pro-
grams. The unique arrangements for insurance regulation in the
United States evolved in part from the behavior of the insurance
industry in the boom and bust cycles that characterized the Ameri-
can economy after the Civil War.'09 Specifically, in boom times,
under-capitalized and unsophisticated insurers would sell fire and
other insurance at unrealistically low rates and use questionable
practices, such as deep discounts for desirable, low risk customers,
to get business from other insurers that charged higher and more
realistic rates. With underwriting profits spent, these insurers
would become insolvent and fail to pay claims, particularly in bad
economic times. Ih response, insurers signed compacts with one
another to cooperate in setting adequate rates and asked states,
which generally addressed regulatory problems during this period,
for greater regulatory protection. States began to regulate rates
and generally required that rates be adequate and nondiscrimina-
tory between similarly situated policy holders.
State regulation was also allowed to flourish without federal
intervention due to the 1869 Supreme Court decision in Paul v.
Virginia,n ° which held that insurance was not a transaction in• 111
interstate commerce. Many states prohibited compacts among• 112
insurers, but state enforcement was weak. In the 1930s, the anti-
competitive conduct of insurers attracted federal attention. The
U.S. Department of Justice sued a multi-state rating bureau for
fixing premium rates and boycotting outside insurers in violation
108. See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, The NAIC: A Tradition of Con-
sumer Protection (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.naic.org/1misc/6aboumaic/about/
about01.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
109. See BANKS McDOWELL, THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE REGULATION 41-44 (1994)
(describing the historical evolution of state insurance regulation).
110. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); see also McDowELL, supra note 109, at 41-44.
111. See Paul, 75 U.S. at 183.
112. See id.
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of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 113 In United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters,"4 the Supreme Court ruled that insurance was a
transaction in interstate commerce subject to the federal antitrust
laws." 5 States, the NAIC, and the insurance industry wanted to
continue state regulation and persuaded Congress to enact the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to shield the insurance industry from
federal antitrust laws." 6
Upon enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the NAIC be-
came much more influential." 7 In 1947, it developed and approved
its Model Unfair Trade Practices Act' and by 1949 most states had
enacted that model or a similar version." 9 In part, this influence
stemmed from state concern that Congress would reform the
unique exemption from federal antitrust regulation if states did
not effectively regulate insurance-a concern that has persisted
since the McCarran-Ferguson Act's enactment. 12 Since that time,
the NAIC has developed model legislation on many issues and de-
veloped other programs to improve state insurance regulation.
12 1
States license and regulate all commercial health insurers and
HMOs. The NAIC's Model HMO Act is the basis of most state
HMO statutes./22 State regulation of health insurance historically
has focused on improving the benefit packages of health insurance
plans by mandating inclusion of specific benefits. Specifically,
sixteen states have mandated over twenty kinds of benefits; eight
others have mandated as many as ten. 123 More recently, states have
been active in legislating consumer protections, such as stronger
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
114. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
115. See id. at 582-83.
116. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33, 33-34 (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1014 (1994)).
117. See ETTLINGER ET AL., supra note 107, at 6.
118. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, Unfair Trade Practices, in
NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES § 880 (1998) [hereinafter NAIC MODEL
LAws].
119. SeeETTLINGERETAL., supranote 107, at6-7.
120. See id. at 6.
121. See NAIC MODEL LAws, supra note 118.
122. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, Health Maintenance Or-
ganization Model Act of 1995, in NAIC MODEL LAWS, supra note 118. See generally BARBARA ALLAN
SHICKICH, LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION IN
HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAw: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR HOSPITALS, HMOs AND EXTENDED CARE
FACILITIES § 16.4 (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991) (describing state HMO regulation).
123. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, COMPENDIUM OF STATE
LAWS ON INSURANCE TOPicS: MANDATED BENEFITS (1995). See generally U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-96-161, HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION: VARYING STATE
REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF INSURANCE (1999) (describing how state insurance code re-
quirements such as mandated benefits affect the cost of insurance).
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disclosure requirements and more open utilization review, into
state HMO statutes.1
24
The NAIC also participates in the regulation of managed care
plans, including many of the new risk bearing entities that have
emerged in recent years. The NAIC has proposed model legislation
to strengthen the state regulation of health insurance and
launched its "CLEAR" initiative to reform state regulation of all
managed care plans. 126 Specifically, the "CLEAR" initiative endeav-
ors to increase the use of common definitions and promote
uniform regulation of health plans. 12 This initiative includes five
model statutes aimed at all types of health plans: the Managed
Care Plan Network Adequacy, Health Carrier Grievance Proce-
dure, Utilization Review, Quality Assessment and Improvement," r r" • 128
and Health Care Professional Credentialing Verification. These
model statutes impose basic quality standards upon managed care
health plans and sponsoring carriers to protect consumers when
they are either restricted as to their choice of provider or offered
incentives to select a particular provider.
12 9
The NAIC has also focused on the treatment of provider
sponsored networks-an increasingly competitive response of
providers to HMO expansion in many states. The development of
these networks has been controversial. The provider community
does not want them to be regulated as insurance companies, as
then they would be subject to the strict solvency regulation of state
124. See generally 1 GERALDINE DALLEK ET AL., CONSUMER PROTECTIONS IN STATE HMO
LAWS: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1995) (describing the various requirements for
HMOs that states have enacted in recent years); Families USA Foundation, The Text of Key State
HMO Consumer Protection Provisions: The Best from the States (last modified Nov. 10, 1999)
<http://www.familiesusa.org/hmotoc.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform); Healthcare Quality: Grievance Procedures: Hearings on Examining How to Implement Improved
Health Claim Grievance Procedures Focusing on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Requirements Regarding Internal Review of Health Benefit Claims and the Need for External Review, and
S. 1712, to Improve the Quality of Health Benefit Plans and Provide Protetctions for Consumers Enrolled in
Such Plans Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong., 46-69 (1998)
(statement of Molly Stauffer, Health Policy Tracking Service, National Conference of State
Legislatures) (comparing the various HMO consumer grievance procedures that all states re-
quire); Families USA Foundation, HMO Consumers at Risk: States to the Rescue (visited Sept. 4,
1999) <http://www.familiesusa.org/farisk.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform) (describing consumer protection measures introduced by states in recent years).
125. CLEAR stands for Consolidated Licensure for Entities Assuming Risk.
126. See Healthcare Quality and Consumer Protection: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resoures, 105th Cong., 66-74 (1997) [hereinafter Healthcare Quality Hearings]
(statement of Kathleen Sebelius, National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
127. See id.
128. See NAIC MODEL LAWS, supra note 118.
129. See Healthcare Quality Hearings, supra note 126, at 66-74.
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regulators.13 The NAIC has taken the position that these entities
are "insurers" and should be subject to state insuranceS • 131
regulation. Many are concerned that these health plans do not
have adequate capital reserves and other safeguards to ensure their
solvency and thus their continued ability to meet the needs for
health care services of network members.12 The NAIC has also
analyzed the nature of different types of risk bearing managed care
plans and their appropriate regulation.
l
3
2. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act-Congress enacted
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
following a perceived crisis in the availability of pensions for
American workers.14 ERISA regulates pension plans and also
"employee benefit plans" which include life, health, and disability
insurance plans that are offered to employees. 3 5 The Act's legisla-
tive history suggests that Congress was primarily concerned with
regulating pension plans and that the Act's inclusion of other types
of employee benefits, such as health insurance, was a secondary
136
concern.
The Act establishes requirements for employee benefit plans
that are eligible for favorable federal tax treatment.3 7 The key re-
quirements are disclosure and reporting practices regarding the
plans' characteristics to plan participants and beneficiaries
(dependents of employees). 38 Regarding reporting and disclosure,
plan administrators must provide plan participants and beneficiar-
ies with a summary plan description that is both comprehensive
130. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Provider Sponsored Organizations and Pnroider Service Networks-
Rationale and Regulation, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 263, 267-68 (1996) (presenting the provider per-
spective on provider sponsored networks).
131. See Overwhelming Opinion of NAIC Group That Provider Networks Be Licensed, 4 Health L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1264 (Aug. 17, 1995).
132. See generally John S. Conniff, Regulating Managed Healthcare Provider Sponsored Organiza-
tions, 16J. INS. REG. 377, 383-84 (1998) (arguing that consequences of financial insolvency are
equally great for PSOs as for HMOs, and therefore relatively relaxed solvency requirements for
PSOs are unjustified); Allison Overbay & Mark Hall, Insurance Regulation of Providers That Bear
Risk, 22 Am. J.L. & MED. 361 (1996) (describing legal and policy issues associated with provider
sponsored networks).
133. See NATIONAL ASSOcIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, THE REGULATION OF
HEALTH RIsK-BEARING ENTITIES (1997) (analyzing various means of regulating health risk
bearing entities).
134. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)).
135. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
136. See Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Shafiler, Health Policy and ERISA: Interest Groups and
Semipreemption, 14J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 239, 240-41 (1989).
137. See ERISA § 402, 88 Stat. at 875-76.
138. See id. §§ 101-105, 88 Stat. at 840-49.
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and comprehensible."9 The Act also establishes the plan's adminis-
trator as a "fiduciary" with associated duties and liabilities to planr- • • 140
participants and beneficiaries.
ERISA regulates through enforcement of duties and liabilities of
plan fiduciaries, who are required to act solely in the interest of
plan participants and beneficiaries.14 ' ERISA also specifies the du-
ties of the fiduciary in specific situations and outlines rules of their
fiduciary liability.4 4 The use of the fiduciary as the regulatory
mechanism reflects ERISA's emphasis on pension protection with
its associated emphasis on solvency, asset management, and other
related issues.
143
ERISA has very specific enforcement provisions.' 44 All plans must
maintain internal review procedures under section 503 of ERISA.1
45
Section 502(a) authorizes civil actions against plan fiduciaries for
any breach of ERISA requirements, including plan fiduciary de-
terminations under section 503.146 ERISA authorizes equitable
relief as well as damages, although damage awards are limited to
the recovery of lost benefits. In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux,148 the Supreme Court ruled that ERISA's enforcement
remedies preempted state remedies.
149
150
For all covered employee benefit plans, ERISA preempts state
laws that would otherwise regulate employee benefit plans."' Al-
though ERISA explicitly excludes state insurance codes fromS 151
preemption, it provides that employee benefit plans will not be
deemed insurers for purposes of state insurance regulation.' Con-
sequently, a self-insured employee health plan clearly will fall
139. See id. § 102(a), 88 Stat. at 840.
140. See id. § 404, 88 Stat. at 877, (delineating the duties of fiduciaries under ERISA plans).
141. See id. §§ 404-405, 88 Stat. at 877-79.
142. See id. § 404(a), 88 Stat. at 877.
143. Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of Major Claims and Defenses 1 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study, 1999), available in Westlaw, SD 89 ALI-ABA 1; Catherine L. Fisk,
Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee
Benefits, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 153, 159 (1995); SusanJ. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer
Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALEJ. ON REG. 61, 65 & n.15 (1998).
144. See Richard Rouco, Comment, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA.
L. REv. 631, 634-36(1994); see also Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Healthcare Claimants: Practical
Assessment of a Neglected Issue in Health Reform, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 723, 738-63 (1994).
145. See ERISA § 503, 88 Stat. at 893.
146. See id. § 502 (a), 88 Stat. at 891.
147. See id. § 502(a) (1) (B), 88 Stat. at 891-92.
148. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
149. See id. at 54-55.
150. See ERISA § 401, 88 Stat. at 874-85.
151. See id. § 514(a), 88 Stat. at 897.
152. See id. § 514(b), 88 Stat. at 897.
153. See id. § 514(c), 88 Stat at 897.
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under the ERISA preemption and be subject only to ERISA re-
quirements. If the employer purchases health insurance from a
commercial insurance company, aspects of the health plan that
relate to the business of insurance may be regulated by state insur-
ance laws.
154
Historically, courts have interpreted broadly ERISA preemp-
tion.155 In Pilot Life Insurance,1 56 the Supreme Court ruled that
ERISA preempted state causes of action in tort for bad faith breach
against employee welfare benefit plans and the commercial insur-
ers that funded these plans. 157 The effect of this decision has been
to limit significantly the tort liability of HMOs to members of em-
ployer-sponsored health plans. But more importantly, as discussed
below, this preemption provision and its interpretation by the
federal courts have caused considerable dislocation in the private
health insurance market and have thwarted state efforts at reforms.
In an important recent decision, Corporate Health. Insurance Inc. v.
Texas Department of Insurance,1 9 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas ruled that ERISA did not preempt a
recent and fairly unique state statute that specifically established a
duty, with the associated liability, "to exercise ordinary care when
making health care treatment decisions " 6° on health insurers,
154. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746 (1985).
155. See, e.g., Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Healthcare Access
for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. Rev. 255, 284-86 (1990); Daniel A. Engle, ERISA: To Preempt
or Not to Preempt, That is the Question!, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 431, 432 (1987); Margaret G. Farrell,
ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Healthcare: The Case of Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L.
& MED. 251, 255 (1997); James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health-
care: A Call for "Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States' Role in Formulating Healtheare Policy, 16
CAMPBELL L. REv. 405, 410 (1994); Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and
Managed Care Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REv. 985,
1003 (1998); Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues,
51 VAND. L. REv. 1149, 1182 (1998); WilliamJ. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws
Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. Rev. 1313, 1322-23
(1984); Michael S. Ackerman, Note, ERISA: Preemption of State Healthcare Laws and Worker Well-
Being, 1981 U. ILL. L. Rev. 825, 839.
156. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
157. See id. at 51, 57. For analyses of the problematic relation between the ERISA pre-
emption provisions and medical liability under state tort law, see, for example, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-98-154, EMPLOYER-BASED MANAGED CARE PLANS:
ERISA's EFFECT ON REMEDIES FOR BENEFIT DENIALS AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1998); Barry
Ik Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419,
494-95 (1997); Karen A. Jordan, Tort Liability for Managed Care: The Weakening of ERISA 's Protec-
tive Shield, 25J.L. MED. & ETHICS 160, 163 (1997);Jack K. Kilcullen, Gropingfor the Reins: ERISA,
HMO Malpractice, and Enterprise Liability, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 38 (1996).
158. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
159. 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
160. TEX. ClV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (West 1999).
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HMOs and "other managed care entit[ies].""6 The court ruled that
ERISA did not preempt such a Texas statute as Congress did not
intend to enable health plans to escape liability for the medical
decisions they make, control or influence.1 62 It will be interesting to
see if other states adopt similar statutes specifically imposing liabil-
ity on health insurers, HMOS and MCOS for their health care
decision making and also whether such statutes withstand judicial
challenges. If so, statutes of this type may constitute useful vehicles
for addressing some of the problems in the current federal-state
partnership and facilitate health care reform.
II. PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE
FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP IN HEALTH POLICY
In reforming the federal relationship, it is useful to emphasize
the respective strengths and weaknesses of states and the federal
government in solving social problems, such as lack of adequate
and affordable health coverage, through public programs and
regulation. These respective strengths and weaknesses should be
accommodated and, indeed, exploited in designing a reformed
federal relationship capable of meeting the challenges of health
reform.
States have strengths in dealing with the financing and delivery
of health care for the poor by virtue of their stewardship of the
Medicaid program and other health and welfare programs under
the Social Security Act. Further, in both public benefit and
regulatory programs, states are able to accommodate local needs
and conditions in ways that are simply not possible for the federal
government. State policy makers understand local conditions and
traditions better and thus presumably have greater sensitivity and
flexibility in crafting responsive strategies to local conditions and
traditions.
However, states historically have been hampered in the
implementation of costly social welfare programs, especially when
neighboring states are not taking comparable action. States
161. Id. § 88.002(a)-(b). Missouri also passed a similar statute. See Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 354.627 (Supp. 1999).
162. See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 620. See generally Christine E. Brasel, Man-
aged Care Liability: State Legislation May Arm Angry Members with Legal Ammo to Fire at Their
MCOs for Cost Containment Tactics ... But Could It Backfire?, 27 CAP. U. L. REv. 449 (1999)
(describing recent court decisions regarding ERISA preemption of state health care con-
sumer protection legislation).
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compete with one another for businesses and other economic
opportunities and are at a severe disadvantage if their taxes are
higher than other states. 16  Additionally, if states are tougher
regulators compared to neighboring states, the, are at a
disadvantage in competing for economic opportunity.
The federal government, on the other hand, has the ability to
generate sufficient funds through taxation from throughout the
United States to launch more expensive social programs. It has
done so with the social insurance and cash assistance programs
under the Social Security Act. Similarly, the federal government is
able to implement regulatory regimes throughout the country to
achieve the national uniformity necessary in a national economy. It
is thus not surprising that the general model of economic regula-
tion in the United States has been through federal regulatory
commissions. The regulation of insurance through states is a his-
torical anomaly and probably has persisted because of the work of
the NAIC in providing uniform laws and technical assistance to
state regulatory programs to achieve nationwide regulatory uni-
formity and consistency.
65
It should be emphasized that a reformed federal-state relation-
ship in health care must be a genuine partnership and must not be
created through federal mandates. Indeed, several Supreme Court
decisions have limited the ability of Congress to pass laws requiring
state regulatory action.'6a Some scholars have suggested that these
cases severely limit the ability of the federal government to require
states to implement a particular health reform strategy. 167 In addi-
163. See FrankJ. Thompson, New Federalism and Healthcare Policy: States and the Old Questions,
11J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 647, 648 (1986).
164. See id.
165. See supra Part I.C.1.
166. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-81 (1992); see also Erwin
Chermerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN L. REv. 1219 (1997)
(offering a critique of these Supreme Court decisions); Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality
and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1009 (1997) (same); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Coop-
erative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARiz. L. REV. 205 (1997).
See generally Cynthia A. Baker & Jonathan D. Mattingly, National Power and State Autonomy: Cali-
brating the New "New Federalism, "32 IND. L. REv. 1 (1998) (discussing federalism issues); Steven
G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v.
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995) (defending a potentially new theory of federalism in recent
Supreme Court decisions); Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism:
The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213 (1996)
(asserting that the Supreme Court is committed to a federalism that requires preservation of
state prerogatives).
167. See generally Elizabeth Anderson, Administering Healthcare: Lessons from the Healthcare
Financing Administration's Waiver Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & POL. 215 (1994) (analyzing the
demonstration, programmatic, and Congressionally mandated demonstration waivers and
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tion, the 104th Congress, in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, 16 prohibited legislation which imposes financial obliga-
tions on states without corresponding federal support. Hopefully,
these changes in federal law will not impede the evolution of the
kind of constructive federal-state relationship needed in the future
to address the complex problems as enhanced access to health
care for the poor.
A. The Experience of States with Public Health Coverage
In the last twenty years, states have been quite active in trying to
address the problem of the lack of health coverage for the unin-
sured poor. Over the years, many states have experimented with
innovative approaches to expand coverage for underserved per-
sons. At least seven states have enacted comprehensive health
reform and major coverage expansions,1 69 although these efforts
have not always succeeded, even in big states with large tax bases
and sophisticated bureaucracies to finance and manage compre-
hensive programs."v Many other states have made less ambitious
efforts, generally through Medicaid expansions, to expand cover-. • 171
age and/or access to care for the low-income uninsured. Indeed,
identifying needed reforms); Richard Briffault, Federalism and Healthcare Reform: Is Haifa Loaf
Really Worse Than None?, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 611 (1994) (addressing incentives the
federal government provides states to reform health care); Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and
Federalism, Legal Impediments to State Healthcare Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121 (1993)
(describing how federalism barriers affect federal and state efforts to accomplish health re-
form). But see Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth
Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489 (1994) (analyzing
constitutional challenges to health reform bills in light of Supreme Court cases that address
the limits of federalism in other contexts, concluding that the federal government does have
methods to coax states into adopting various reforms).
168. Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 2, 109 Stat. 48, 48 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (1995)).
169. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-96-35, HEALTH IN-
SURANCE FOR CHILDREN: STATE AND PRIVATE PROGRAM CREATE NEW STRATEGIES TO INSURE
CHILDREN (1996) (describing and analyzing recent state efforts at major reforms and coverage
expansions); John Holahan & Len Nichols, State Health Policy in the 1990s, in HEALTH POLICY,
FEDERALISM AND THE AMERICAN STATES 39, 48-54 (Robert F. Reich & William D. White eds.,
1996) (describing the seven comprehensive health reform programs, along with several other
pending reforms in different states); Pamela Paul-Shaheen, The States and Health Reform: The
Road Traveled and Lessons Learned from the Seven That Took the Lead, 23J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
319, 321 (1998) (same); The Robert WoodJohnson Foundation, State Healthcare Reform: Looking
Back Toward the Future (last modified Sept. 1997) <http://www.rwjf.org/library/spcrpt97/
spmain.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (noting the setbacks
incurred by states that attempted comprehensive reform).
170. See Paul-Shaheen, supra note 169, at 353.
171. See generally Colleen M. Grogan, Hope in Federalism? What Can the States Do and What Are
They Likely to Do, 20J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 477 (1995) (discussing the limitations on the
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by the close of the Bush administration, in which no Medicaid
waivers for statewide health reforms were approved, 112 there was
considerable pessimism about the ability of states to sustain state
health insurance programs for the uninsured poor.13
In the 1990s, states have done better in expanding coverage for
the uninsured poor when they have joined with the federal gov-
ernment as partners through the Medicaid program. In so doing,
they have been able to raise the requisite funds to finance coverage
expansions that are difficult for states to get from general revenues
and other sources alone. The major reason for this significant suc-
cess compared to the 1980s and earlier is the Clinton
administration's policy regarding the use of section 1115 waivers
under the Social Security Act to fund innovative state programs for
the uninsured poor. 1 5 Specifically, since 1993, when the Clinton
administration loosened the requirements for section 1115 waivers,
many states have expanded Medicaid coverage to low-income unin-
sured.
7 6
There is one cloud on the horizon with respect to the prospect
of public health insurance as a strategy for expanding coverage for
ability of states to enact comprehensive reform and suggesting that states will likely proceed
with caution, implementing mainly "low-cost" reform options); Howard M. Leichter, State Gov-
ernments and Their Capacity for Healthcare Reform, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM AND THE
AMERICAN STATES, supra note 169, at 151 (arguing that states are competent to reform health
care slowly until federal government reenters the arena); Trish Riley, Can We Count on the States
to Cover the Poor and Uninsured, in THE FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WHO WILL CARE FOR
THE POOR AND UNINSURED? 273 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1998) (describing the incre-
mental changes possible with state-level health care reforms); Raymond C. Scheppach, The State
Health Agenda: Austerty, Efficiency, and Monitoring the Emerging Maket, in THE FUTURE U.S.
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra, at 285 (summarizing the changes in the relationship between
federal and state government regarding Medicaid and discussing challenges to future reform).
172. See ThomasJ. Anton, New Federalism and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships: The 1mpli-
cationsfor Health Policy, 22J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 691, 714 (1997).
173. See Michael S. Sparer, States and the Healthcare Crisis, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
503, 504 (1993) (arguing that interstate variations in health care policy may undermine efforts
at health care reform); see also Marilyn Moon &John Holahan, Can States Take the Lead in Health-
care Reform?, 268 JAMA 1588, 1593-94 (1992) (suggesting that state proposals for health
insurance reform that would cover the uninsured poor may be impossible to implement with-
out federal assistance). See generally Fernando R. Laguarda, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories
of Healthcare Reform, 82 GEO. LJ. 159 (1993) (arguing that the ability of states to act as laborato-
ries for health care reform is compromised by the efforts of national interest groups).
174. SeeJOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., HEALTH POLICY FOR THE Low-INCOME POPULATION: MA-
JOR FINDINGS FROM THE "ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM" CASE STUDIES 22-24 (The Urban
Inst. Occasional Paper No. 18, 1998); see also Anton, supra note 172, at 713-14 (attributing
growth of state-level reform initiatives in the late 1980s and early 1990s to the explosion in
Medicare expenditures); Shruti Rajan, Publicly Subsidized Health Insurance: A T pology of State
Approaches, HEALTH ArE., May/June 1998, at 101, 102 (examining different approaches to sub-
sidized health insurance taken by states).
175. SeeAnton, supranote 172, at 714.
176. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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the uninsured poor: constitutional procedural protections for
beneficiaries of public entitlement programs are by no means static
or secure. 77 Further, to curtail the open-ended financial obliga-
tions of entitlement programs, Congress and state legislatures have
affirmatively stated that benefits in social programs are not enti-
tlements. For example, in enabling legislation for the new welfare
program, Congress explicitly stated that the legislation created no
entitlement interest in welfare benefits. 78 The new state Childrens'
Health Insurance Program contains a similar provision.179 In its
1994 decision in Colson v. Sillman,180 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit ruled that a Medicaid recipient did
not have a constitutionally protected entitlement interest in certain
Medicaid disability benefits because the state's enabling legislation
accorded discretion to the state agency in determining the need
for benefits and also limited available benefits to those that could
be paid from fiscal appropriations. 18
This combination of statutory denial of entitlement and thus
property status, with subsequent judicial approval and justifica-
tions, significantly compromises the status and stability of benefits
in public health insurance programs. With the preeminence of
prepaid managed care as the primary delivery vehicle for serving
the acute care needs of Medicaid and CHIP recipients, the wither-
ing of constitutional guarantees for the protection of benefits is
particularly distressing. Because of the incentives in managed care
182plans to curtail services in order to contain costs, strong benefici-ary protections are crucial.
177. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1973 (1996) (describing the demise of procedural due process protections).
178. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 103(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (b) (Supp. 1996)).
179. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 2102(b) (4), 111 Stat. 251, 554
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb).
180. 35 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994).
181. See id. at 108-09; see also Pierce, supra note 177, at 1989 (noting the decision as an il-
lustration of the ways in which a property right may be converted into an unprotected
privilege).
182. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Presenting the Physician-
Patient Relationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323 (1995) (describing physician-
patient conflicts created by capitated managed care plans); David Orentlicher, Healthcare Reform
and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 141 (1995); Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in
Managed Care, 332 NEw ENG.J. MED. 604 (1995); Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Meta-
phor Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Healthcare System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED.
241 (1995).
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B. The Experience of States with Private
Health Insurance Regulation
The current federal-state relationship with respect to the regula--- . •183
tion of private health insurance is dysfunctional. Because of
ERISA preemption, states are unable to regulate the private health
insurance market to promote adequate and affordable private
health insurance coverage. Specifically, states' ability to curb unfair
underwriting practices that compromise health coverage for the
seriously ill through regulation of commercial insurers184 is
thwarted by the operation of the ERISA preemption. 1 5 To get
around state regulation of insurance and, in particular, state man-
dates for benefits in insurance plans, employers are self-funding
their employee health plans.186 Employers can thereby avoid state
regulatory requirements for health insurance, such as mandated
benefits, that limit employers' ability to offer less expensive benefit
packages. 18 When states try to regulate commercial health insurers
to prohibit their underwriting practices or rate increases, employ-
ers would self-insure if commercial insurance became too
expensive. Further, if the regulatory climate became too strict in a
state, commercial insurers would leave the state.
One additional source of financial support for state programs to
expand coverage-employers-is out of reach for state programs
because of ERISA preemption. States cannot impose requirements
on employers because such requirements would "relate to" em-
ployee welfare benefit plans and therefore be preempted under
183. See generally Bobinski, supra note 155; Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan,
The Critical Role of ERISA in State Health Reform, HEALTH AFF., Spring (H1) 1994, at 142
(suggesting ERISA reform to allow for state experiments); Farrell, supra note 155; Jacobson &
Pomfret, supra note 155; Jordan, supra note 155; Wendy K. Mariner, Problems with Employer-
Provided Health Insurance-he Employee Retirement Income Security Act and Healthcare Reform, 327
NEW ENG.J. MED. 1682 (1992) (discussing the limitations of ERISA and state efforts to reform
employer-based health coverage plans); Deborah A. Stone, Why the States Can't Solve the Health-
care Crisis, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1992, at 51 (discussing federal versus state reforms).
184. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney et al., Serious Illness and Private Health Coverage: A Unique
Problem Calling for Unique Solutions, 25J.L. MEn. & ETHICS 180 (1997) (describing the problems
that many chronically ill face due to inadequately regulated insurer underwriting practices);
Wendy K Zellers et al., Small-Business Health Insurance: Only the Healthy Need Apply, HEALTH AFF.,
Spring 1992, at 174, 174.
185. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
186. See Steven A. Garfinkel, Self-Insuring Employee Health Benefits, 52 MED. CARE RES. &
REv. 475, 487 (1995); Gail A. Jensen & Jon R Gabel, The Erosion of Purchased Health Insurance,
25 INQUIRY 328, 340 (1988); Patricia McDonnell et al., Self-Insured Health Plans, HEALTHCARE
FINANCING REv., Winter 1986, at 1, 2.




ERISA. 88 Further, the boundaries of the broadly-interpreted pre-
emption clause are hazy,189 thereby discouraging state initiatives
that are even remotely related to employer-sponsored health in-
surance. However, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,' 90 the Supreme Court limited
preemption in holding that statutes that provided surcharges on
hospital rates paid by commercial insurers did not "relate to" em-
ployee welfare benefit plans under ERISA and, accordingly, were
not preempted. 9'
Two recent cases exemplify the problem with ERISA regulated
plans and the operation of the ERISA preemption provisions. 92 In
McGann v. H & H Music Co.,' 93 the Fifth Circuit upheld the district
court's summary judgment against an AIDS victim in an employer-
sponsored health plan that had limited coverage for AIDS to
$5,000 in the year following diagnosis.9 4 In American Medical Secu-
rity, Inc. v. Bartlett,9 5 the Fourth Circuit rejected the effort of
Maryland's insurance regulators to require employee welfare bene-
fit plans that purchased state-regulated stop loss insurance to
comply with state mandated benefit provisions for the primary
plan.'96 The Fourth Circuit concluded that "[w]hen ERISA pre-
empted state law relating to ERISA-covered employee benefit
plans, it may have created a regulatory gap, but Maryland is with-
0,97out authority to fill that gap .... 19
Not surprisingly, many employers-in the quest for cheaper
employee benefits-have become self-insured and thus exempt
from state regulation. In 1995, about forty percent of all Americans
insured through employment were in self-insured employer-
sponsored health plans, and evidence suggests that more employ-
ers are self-insuring their health plans to escape state insurance
regulation. 98 In addition, to protect themselves from undue risk,
employers with self-insured plans purchase stop loss insurance to
188. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ 514(a)-(b), 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)).
189. See Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain
ERISA Pre-Emption, 13 YALEJ. ON REG. 255, 260-61 (1996).
190. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
191. See id. at 649.
192. For the selection of these cases, I am indebted to the discussion in WILLIAM S. CUR-
REN ET AL., HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS 1068-75 (5th ed. 1998).
193. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 981 (1992).
194. See id. at 408.
195. 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 936 (1998).
196. See id. at 365.
197. Id. (citation omitted).
198. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-95-223, EMPLOYER-BASED
HEALTH PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 17-18 (1995).
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pay for losses for a particular patient above a specific dollar
amount, which is often set as low as $5,000.1' One fallout of ERISA
preemption is the development of provider sponsored networks
that contract directly with employer welfare benefit plans and
200thereby escape insurance regulation altogether.
The federal government has done little to reform ERISA to im-
prove regulatory oversight of private health insurance. The 105th
Congress did not pass any of the proposed ERISA reform legisla-201
tion, and prospects for effective reform legislation in the 106th
202Congress seem dim. The Clinton administration proposed
changes to ERISA as well as Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal
health insurance programs to address some of these serious con-
sumer protection problems and strengthen ERISA's consumer
protection provisions. °5
In sum, ERISA creates a bifurcated structure for the regulation
of insurance that is uncoordinated and thus easily manipulated
by regulated parties-for example, providers, insurers, and
employers-to circumvent requirements of either ERISA or state
insurance regulation. Because of this regulatory framework, state
insurance regulators are unable to implement reforms effectively.
20 4
While the NAIC has clearly exhibited leadership in developing
model legislation that coordinates regulation of risk bearing
199. See id. at 12-14.
200. See generally Charles D. Weller, The Secret Life of the Dominant Form of Managed Care: Self-
Insured ERISA Networks, 6 HEALTH MATRix 305 (1996) (describing self-insured ERISA net-
works).
201. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., CRS ISSUE BRIEF: MANAGED HEALTHCARE:
MAJOR ISSUES IN THE 105TH CONGRESS (1998) (describing legislative proposal to reform ERISA
before the 105th Congress); Julie K. Locke, Note, The ERISA Amendment: A Prescription to Sue
MCOs for Wrongful Treatment Decisions, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1027 (1999) (arguing for ERISA
amendments that would allow health care consumers to sue HMOs). But see generally Brasel,
supra note 162 (predicting deleterious effects if legislation extends malpractice liability to
HMOs).
202. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Curbs on Managed Care Still Divide Two Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1999, at A18; James Jeffords, Three Goals for Healthcare Reform in 1999, THE HILL, Jan. 20,
1999, at 30.
203. See Health Insurance Consumer's Bill of Rights Act of 1997, H.R. 2967, 105th Cong.
(1998) (introduced by Rep. Charles Schumer (D-NY)); S. 1499, 105th Cong. (1998)
(introduced by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA)); see also President's Advisory Commission on Con-
sumer Protection and Quality in the Healthcare Industry, Consumer Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities: Report to the President of the United States (last modified July 17, 1998)
<http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/cborr/> (on file with the Univerity of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), implemented in, Office of the President, Memorandum on Federal Agency Compli-
ance with the Patient Bill of Rights, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PES. Doc. 298 (Feb. 20, 1998).
204. See generally PATRICIA BUTLER & KARL POLZER, PRIVATE-SECTOR HEALTH COVER-
AGE: VARIATION IN CONSUMER PROTECTIONS UNDER ERISA AND STATE LAW (1996)
(describing problems ERISA poses for state protection of health care consumers).
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managed care plans and promotes consumer protection, 2 5 states
are precluded from implementing these regulatory protections by
ERISA. It is noteworthy that the NAIC has taken a strong official
position condemning ERISA and its impact on state insurance
206regulation.
C. An Illustrative Case of One State-Indiana
The story of the Indiana Commission on Health Care for the
Working Poor's efforts to design coverage expansions for unin-
sured, low-income workers and families in Indiana exemplifies the
problems states face in expanding coverage for the uninsured
207poor. In 1995, the Indiana legislature established the Commis-
sion with bipartisan support from the Republican legislature and
the Democratic administration of Governor Evan Bayh.2 0 The
Commission's politically-balanced composition included the major
stakeholders in Indiana's health care system-consumers, provid-
ers, insurers, and, most importantly, state legislators. During this
period, Indiana's population was 5.68 million with an uninsur-
210ance rate of 12.6%.
The Republican chair of the Senate Health Committee, Senator
Pat Miller, and the Commissioner of Health in the Democratic
Bayh administration, Dr. John C. Bailey, both served on the Com-
mission and were deeply committed to the Commission's goals as
well as to predominantly private strategies to achieve these goals.
Both Dr. Bailey and Senator Miller were the policy "entrepreneurs"
that pushed for the program and provided the leadership that has
been crucial to successful state coverage expansions. 2 1 The Demo-cratic administration of Governor Frank O'Bannon remained
205. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
206. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, NAIC WHITE PAPER,
ERISA: A CALL FOR REFORM, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSUR-
ANCE COMMISSIONERS 9 (1995).
207. See Eleanor D. Kinney et al., Three Political Realities in Expanding Coverage for the Working
Poor: One State's Experience, HEALTH AF. July/Aug. 1999, at 188, 188-89.
208. See id. at 188.
209. See U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage: 1995 tbl. 1 (last modified Feb. 3,
1999) <http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/cover95/c95tab2.html> (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
210. Seeid.tbl.2.
211. Cf Thomas R. Oliver & Pamela Paul-Shaheen, Translating Ideas into Actions: Entrepre-
neurial Leadership in State Healthcare Reforms, 22J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 721 (1997) (arguing
that "policy entrepreneurs" created receptive markets for comprehensive reforms in a study of
six states that did not include Indiana).
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committed to the Commission's work after the 1996 election, al-
though the O'Bannon administration focused most of its attention
on implementing the Children's Health Insurance Program in In-
diana when it was enacted in 1997.
Indiana is a relatively politically conservative state and its health
policy has been conservative as well. Indiana has never launched a
public health insurance program nor a major Medicaid expansion
for adults. Nor does it have a Medicaid program for the medically
needy. Thus, not surprisingly, the Commission proceeded from
conservative premises: Indiana workers who receive no public assis-
tance should be protected from financial ruin from health care
expenses, and strategies for coverage expansions should be private
with public involvement and funding as a last resort.2
Initially, legislators challenged the state's insurance industry to
develop a private health insurance plan that the state might subsi-
dize to make it affordable to low-income workers and/or their
employers. Thus, the Commission's initial work focused on design-
ing such a plan. However, in the course of the Commission's
deliberations, it became clear that a public or even subsidized pri-
vate health insurance program was not politically feasible.
The Commission estimated that, in 1993 and 1994, there were
105,370 uninsured full time workers and 27,224 uninsured part
time workers in Indiana with incomes below 200% of the federal
poverty level.213 The Commission estimated that providing coverage
to uninsured workers and their families below 200% of the poverty
level under the optimal benefit package (comparable to Indiana's
Medicaid benefit package) would cost $413 million per year and
214the "bare bones" plan would cost $267 million per year.
The Commission was also impressed with health services re-
search findings that state subsidies for insurance premiums of
low-income workers are not sufficient inducements to the poor to
enroll in employer-sponsored health plans1 5 or in individual pri-
212. See INDIANA COMMISSION ON HEALTHCARE FOR THE WORKING POOR, INDIANA STATE
DEP'T OF HEALTH, PRELIMINARY REPORT 1-2 (1995) [hereinafter INDIANA, PRELIMINARY RE-
PORT].
213. See Kinney et al., supra note 207, at exhibit 1; see also INDIANA COMMISSION ON
HEALTHCARE FOR THE WORKING POOR, INDIANA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, OPTIONS FOR Ex-
PANDING HEALTH COVERAGE FOR THE WORKING POOR tbl.V (1996) [hereinafter INDIANA, 1996
REPORT].
214. See Kinney et al., supra note 207, at exhibit 1; see aso INDIANA, 1996 REPORT, supra
note 213, at tbl.V.




vate plans. A recent study tracking small firm coverage con-
cluded that the key factor in declining employee enrollment was.... 217
sharp increases in required worker contributions. The Commis-
sion conducted focus groups of low-income workers that confirmed
these findings.21 " These research findings were consistent with the
experience of a highly advertised, joint insurer-provider program
in Anderson, Indiana that offered a low cost minimum benefit
health insurance plan to low-income workers and families-a plan
much like the Commission's "bare bones" plan. 2'9 Low-income
workers simply did not purchase the subsidized health coverage-
fewer than twenty policies were sold in one year.
These findings were disturbing to the Commission. 20 The price
tag for coverage of Indiana's uninsured workers and families
shocked the Commission and especially its legislator members, who
recognized that state lawmakers would never adopt a state-funded
public program. Indiana could not explore a section 1115 Medi-
caid waiver despite pressure from the hospital industry and the
medical profession because Indiana does not have the requisite
Medicaid medically needy program. The Commission was also con-
cerned that a costly public subsidy for even a "bare-bones"
insurance product would be necessary.
Because of ERISA, the Commission appreciated that it would be
virtually impossible to look to employers for this subsidy. Commer-
cial insurers were also not an attractive source for this subsidy
because they compete with employer self-insured plans and would
be put at a competitive disadvantage if they had to absorb the cost
of the subsidies. Finally, it seemed unlikely that low-income work-
ers were going to purchase even heavily subsidized health
insurance to finance their health care. Why should they when
there are safety net providers available to provide care-albeit at a
cost-when they really need it?
The Commission then explored. other options and focused on
enhancing access to health care services through direct subsidies to
216. See Stephen H. Long & M. Susan Marquis, Gaps in Employer Coverage: Lack of Supply or
Lack of Demand?, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 282, 283; Carolyn W. Madden et al., Voluntary
Public Health Insurance for Low-Income Families: The Decision to Enroll, 20J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
955, 967-68 (1995); M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Worker Demand for Health Insurance in
the Non-Group Market, 14J. HEALTH ECON. 47, 61 (1995).
217. See Paul B. Ginsburg et al., Tracking Small-Firm Coverage, 1989-1996, HEALTH AFT.,
Jan./Feb. 1998, at 167, 170.
218. See Kinney et al., supra note 207, at 189-90.
219. See INDIANA COMMISSION ON HEALTHCARE FOR THE WORKING POOR, INDIANA STATE
DEP'T OF HEALTH, FINAL REPORT 15 (1997) [hereinafter INDIANA, 1997 FINAL REPORT].
220. See INDIANA, 1996 REPORT, supra note 213, at 71 app.D.
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employers and other means.2 2 ' The Commission recognized that
many providers in Indiana were already serving the state's unin-
sured population. These "safety net" providers included
community health centers, local health departments, and certain
public and private nonprofit hospitals that historically cared for
the uninsured poor in their areas. Many safety net hospitals in In-
diana, in collaboration with community health centers, have
sought to "manage" the care of uninsured patients by enrolling
them in internal "managed care plans."
The Commission ultimately rejected a state subsidized insurance
program and even a subsidized private insurance program for the
low-income uninsured.222 Instead, it recommended expanded state
funding for community health centers participating in networks
with safety net hospitals and a stop loss subsidy program to encour-
age safety net hospitals to provide coordinated care to the
uninsured poor and limit their exposure to uncompensated cata-
221strophic care for uninsured poor enrolled in the network.
Many states have also sought to mobilize safety net providers in
224the care of the uninsured poor. Safety net providers, established
explicitly to serve the poor, already provide a substantial volume of
services to the uninsured poor and have been critical in maintain-
225ing the availability of care for this population. Community health
centers serve, with substantial support from direct funding from
state and federal agents, many uninsured poor, as two out of every
five community health center clients are uninsured and the num-
ber of their clients has increased in the 1990s.226 Public and some
private nonprofit hospitals, by virtue of law, mission, or tradition,
have actual or perceived obligations to serve the uninsured poor
and receive substantial support from local property tax revenues,
other tax preferences, and disproportionate share funding under
221. See INDIANA, 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 219, at 44-45.
222. See INDIANA, 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 219, at 52-54; Kinney et al., supra note
207, at 191.
223. See INDIANA, 1997 FINAL REPORT, supra note 219, at 52-54.
224. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. NORTON & DEBRA J. LIPSON, PORTRAITS OF THE SAFETY NET: THE
MARKET, POLICY ENVIRONMENT, AND SAFETY NET RESPONSE (1998); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, STATE PROFILES (1995).
225. See Karen Donelan et al., Whatever Happened to the Health Insurance Crisis in the United
States, 276JAMA 1346, 1350 (1996). But see Marc L. Berk et al., Ability to Obtain Healthcare: Recent
Estimates from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation National Access to Care Survey, HEALTH Asr., Fall
1995, at 139, 140-41 (finding that a substantial portion of the population is falling through the
safety net).
226. See BUREAU OF PRIMARY HEALTHCARE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
SUPPORTED PROGRAMS: 1998 HIGHLIGHTS REPORT 1 (1999).
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the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 7 In 1994, hospitals nation-
ally incurred $16.8 billion in uncompensated care expenses-an
estimated 6.1% of all hospital costs. 22s Safety net hospitals, commu-
nity health centers, and other safety net providers have
traditionally cooperated in serving the uninsured poor and have
active referral relationships with community health centers. More
recently, such hospitals have formed networks to attract Medicaid
229and other third party payer contracts.229
Indiana's experience is consistent with that of other states. In
general, the cost of covering low-income workers and families is
more expensive than small, relatively conservative states are willing
to pay. Even more liberal states that have launched state-funded
health insurance programs have declined to proceed with planned
expansions and have halted programs because of cost concerns.2'1
Clearly because of ERISA preemption and other factors, many
states have looked to safety net providers to serve the uninsured
poor.
The Commission's ultimate recommendations were influenced
by two factors in the relationship between the states and the
federal government. First, the cost of coverage expansions is
beyond the means of a single state, particularly when neighboring
states have not taken on comparable commitments. 232 Second, the
ability of states to mandate health insurance coverage through
employment or even to seek subsidies from employers in financing
private health insurance coverage is hampered by the re-
quirements of ERISA. If states pursue the strategy of expanding
coverage through insurance, they must find sources of financing
beyond state revenues and personal contributions of beneficiaries,
227. See Larry Gage, The Future of Safety Net Hospitals, in THE FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE
SYsTEM, supra note 171, at 123, 127-28.
228. See Peter J. Cunningham & Ha T. Tu, A Changing Picture of Uncompensated Care,
HEALTH AF.,July/Aug. 1997, at 167, 169-70. See generally DebraJ. Lipson & Naomi Naierman,
Effects of Health System Change on Safety-Net Providers, HEALTH ArF., Summer 1996, at 33
(discussing community health centers' financial strategies for providing care to the uninsured);
Joel Weissman, Uncompensated Hospital Care: Will It Be There If We Need It?, 276 JAMA 823 (1996)
(outlining problems of safety net hospitals).
229. See generally NORTON & LIPSON, supra note 224; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUB. No. HEHS-95-143, COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS: CHALLENGES IN TRANSITIONING TO
PREPAID MANAGED CARE (1995) (describing transitional prepaid managed care); Helen Halpin
Schauffler & Jessica Wolin, Community Health Clinics Under Managed Competition: Navigating Un-
charted Waters, 21J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 461 (1996).
230. For a description of the health reform experiences of other states, see HOLAHAN ET
AL., supra note 174; NORTON & LIPSON, supra note 224; and PAUL-SHAHEEN, supra note 169.
231. See PAUL-SHAHEEN, supra note 169, at 355.
232. See Kinney et al., supra note 207, at 188 (describing the health reform experience
of Indiana).
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or pursue other strategies for expanding access to services for the
low-income uninsured.
The Commission's recommendations for enhancing access to
care for low-income workers and their families have yet to be fully
implemented. In 1996 the legislature appropriated funds to assist
community health centers in forming safety net provider networks
233but has not proceeded further. On the other hand, Indiana
moved quickly to design and implement the Children's Health In-
surance program when it came on line in 1997. With federal
matching funds available to make the program financially feasible
and the Medicaid program infrastructure in place to provide the
technical expertise and operational support, the program was im-
plemented within one year. These developments suggest that
federal funding across states is an important if not dispositive fac-
tor in the success of substantive state efforts to expand health
coverage for the uninsured.
D. The Contours of a More Productive Federal-State Partnership
Optimally, the, concept of federalism calls for a relationship be-
tween the federal government and states that allocates
responsibilities and power between the two levels of government in
a manner that best facilitates the achievement of beneficial public
goals. With this norm in mind, it is useful to sketch the contours of
a federal-state partnership that will move toward the societal goal
of universal health coverage, and especially coverage of the unin-
sured poor.
In defining the federal-state partnership to achieve this goal,
several legislative and regulatory changes are necessary at both the
state and federal levels. In crafting these changes, it is important to
be mindful of the political and jurisprudential realities that
constrain both state and federal legislative and judicial law makers
as they design reforms. Specifically, the Republican Congress has
exhibited considerable reluctance to impose mandates on states, as
evidenced by the enactment of the Unfunded Mandates Act.
23 4
Also, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal
Constitution as being far more deferential to the authority and
rights of states than at anytime in recent years.3 5 Indeed, in the
233. See id. at 191.
234. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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1990s, the Supreme Court handed down several decisions that
sharply limited the ability of Congress to authorize lawsuits against
states-an important dimension of federal power.236
The most practical and immediate steps that Congress could
take are, first, to reform ERISA and, second, establish health cov-
erage programs that provide matching funds for state health
insurance programs for the uninsured and allow states great flexi-
bility in designing state programs that really reach the uninsured
in need. Hopefully future federal court decisions will clarify the
ERISA preemption clause and delineate the zone in which the
states and the federal government can regulate effectively to en-
hance coverage for the uninsured and protect coverage for the
insured. These two approaches are outlined briefly below.
1. Reform ERISA-There are immediate steps that would im-
prove the accessibility and affordability of private health insurance
for low-income workers and their employers. 2" Given the reality
that most non-elderly Americans obtain health insurance through
the workplace, it is necessary to address problems with the ERISA
framework for this coverage and, in particular, the bifurcated sys-
tem for regulating all private health insurance created by the
ERISA preemption.238 Specifically, there are four ways to fix the bi-
furcated system for regulating private health insurance and other
problems created by ERISA.21
First, regulate ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans in a
manner that assures adequate, affordable, and available health in-
surance coverage through employment. Congress has already
adopted this approach in a piecemeal fashion in extending health
coverage to vulnerable groups after employment relationships have
been terminated14 and, more recently, in enhancing the portabil-
241
ity of health insurance coverage for people with serious illnesses.
236. See id.
237. See generally Maria O'Brien Hylton, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Deregulation of In-
surance to Advantage the Working Poor, 24 FoRDHAM Uea. L.J. 687 (1997) (presenting ideas for
expanding health coverage for low-income workers through health insurance reform).
238. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
239. SeeJana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good Intentions: Problems
and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under ER/SA, 31 Loy. U. Ci. LJ. 29, 55, 67
(1999) (delineating in detail how ERISA can be reformed to accomplish effective regulation of
private health insurance).
240. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§§ 10001-10003, 100 Stat. 222, 222-37 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.,
29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. (Supp. 111996)).
241. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.
(1996)).
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Congress has also mandated at least one benefit-mental health
242
care-for ERISA-regulated plans. One area that cries out for fed-
eral regulation is the increasingly common practice among
employers with self-insured plans of using general liability insur-
ance to insure against excess risk in their health plans and still
243evade state health insurance regulation.
It is noteworthy that the Clinton administration has already
taken significant steps in using extant authority under federal law
to strengthen federal regulation to protect patients enrolled in
ERISA plans in requiring federal agencies, including the Depart-
ment of Labor which regulates ERISA plans, to implement the
patient protections recommended by the Presidents' Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health
Care Industry. 24 However, these protections are primarily proce-
dural, such as improved grievance procedures and enhanced
publication of plan policies. They do not address the adequacy,
affordability, or availability of employer-sponsored health coverage.
Second, narrow and delineate the boundaries of the ERISA
preemption to define the scope of states' regulatory authority over
health insurance that affects but does not govern employer-
sponsored health insurance. Federal legislation should clearly
delineate the scope of federal regulation under ERISA and
specifically the ERISA preemption clause and its pertinent terms.
Specifying just what provisions of ERISA should be amended and
how to achieve these objectives is beyond the scope of this Article.
245Other scholars have addressed this issue in great detail .
Nevertheless, at the very least, statutory amendments should clarify
242. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 712, 110 Stat. 2944, 2945-
47 (codified at 29 U.S.C § 1185a (Supp. 111996)).
243. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text; see also Strain & Kinney, supra note
239, at 54-57, 67, 68.
244. Memorandum on Federal Agency Compliance with the Patient's Bill of Rights, su-
pra note 203, implementing ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND QUALITY
IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY, supra note 203. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Department of
Labor's Response to the Health Care Commission's Bill of Rights: Report to the President and Vice Presi-
dent of the United States (last modified Apr. 16, 1998) <http://www.dol.gov/dol/
pwba/public/whatsnew/meredith.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
245. See, e.g., Robert N. Covington, Amending ERISA's Preemption Scheme, 8 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1 (1999) (containing a detailed analysis of the current problems with the case
law on the ERISA preemption clause and specifying amendments that could clarify the cur-
rent confusion over the scope of the ERISA preemption and its relationship to state
regulation); Strain & Kinney, supra note 239 (specifying how ERISA might be amended to
enhance federal regulation of ERISA plans and coordinate such regulation with state regula-
tion of health insurers, HMOs and other MCOs).
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the scope of state authority to regulate commercial insurers,
HMOs, and MCOs that fund employee welfare benefit plans.
Third, Congress should also clarify the circumstances under
which managed care organizations that contract with employer
plans are liable for their misconduct toward members of employer-
sponsored managed care plans. This has proven to be the most
contentious issue in the debate over patient protection reform leg-
islation in the 105th and 106th Congresses and, indeed, has been
the major stumbling block to the evolution and passage of a bipar-
tisan patient protection bill. 46 Nevertheless, lower federal courts in
recent years are exhibiting greater sympathy toward claimants
blocked from remedies against HMOs because of the ERISA pre-
emption clause and are devising theories to get around these
barriers.14' Also, as discussed above,'48 Texas and Missouri have en-
acted legislation specifically granting rights to sue health insurers,
HMOs, and MCOs for negligent decision making with respect to
health care decisions regarding members. Ideally, although un-
likely, Congress should recognize the potential effectiveness of tort
liability in limiting the excesses and misconduct of managed care
organizations in the current environment of cost containment. It is
noteworthy that as this Article goes to press, the United States Su-
preme Court is reviewing a Seventh Circuit decision ruling that a
medically injured ERISA plan beneficiary can sue a managed care
organization for breach of plan fiduciary duties under ERISA.
Hopefully the decision in this case will provide helpful guidance to
Congress and states as they endeavor to clarify and even establish
tort liability of HMOs and other managed care plans with respect
to members of employer sponsored health plans.
Finally, the federal government should authorize carefully
crafted waivers from ERISA for states with health insurance pro-
grams that meet specific requirements. It is not coincidental that
the only state with nearly universal coverage under state programs,
Hawaii, has a waiver of ERISA requirements for employee welfare
246. See supra note 1; see alsoJILL A. MARSTELLER & RANDALL R. BOVBJERG, FEDERALISM
AND PATIENT PROTECTION: CHANGING ROLES FOR STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (The
Urban Inst. Occasional Paper No. 28, 1999) (reviewing the patient protection legislation in
the 106th Congress and the prospects for its passage).
247. See Robert Pear, Series of Rulings Eases Constraints on Suing H.M.0. 's: New Gains for
Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1999, at Al.
248. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
249. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied,
170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 10 (1999).
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benefit plans.25 ° Waivers can be designed to preserve interstate uni-
formity of requirements for ERISA-regulated employee welfare
benefit plans while according states latitude in experimenting with
ways to promote employer contributions to state health coverage
expansions. An expanding waiver authority imaginatively applied
could greatly facilitate state innovation in coverage expansions for
the uninsured poor.
2. Accord Federal Support for Coverage Expansions-The federal
government must become more involved in the financing of health
care for the uninsured poor. In recent years, the prevailing model
for such financing has been through matching funds for state pro-
grams. This model works very well, as exemplified in the Clinton
administration's creative use of Section 1122 waiver authority un-
251der the Social Security Act, for coverage expansions for the poor
through Medicaid and more recently through the newly enacted
CHIP program. 52 Under this model, the federal statute establishes
basic criteria that a state program must meet to be eligible for fed-
253eral matching funds.
Any federal statute should leave considerable flexibility to states
as to how they will meet federal criteria as they design and imple-
ment state programs. Nevertheless, there are four main criteria
that the statute should specify as federal requirements. First, simi-
larly situated beneficiaries should be treated the same and not
discriminated against in benefits or coverage. Second, states must
be required to maintain their financial commitment to the pro-
gram over time.
Third, the federal government must be assured that states
provide comparable value for federal funds. This criterion is more
complicated to meet. It implicates program design and, more
specifically, performance. It invites detailed federal regulation as to
how states design and implement programs and also how they
measure and evaluate program performance. The federal
government should, however, decline the invitation to micro-
regulate state programs to achieve this goal and adopt less intrusive
ways to assure comparable value for federal funds across states. For
example, the federal government and states could develop
250. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 301, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)); see also Fox & Schaffler, supra note 136,
at 250; Laguarda, supra note 173, at 179-85.
251. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
253. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and Healthcare Re-
form, 28 CONN. L. REv. 115, 117-18 (1995). For commentary on this proposal, see Symposium,
On theFuture of State Healthcare Reform, 28 CONN. L. REv. 113 (1995).
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population-based outcome measures that would provide accurate
information on program performance and serve as a basis for
nationwide comparison of state performance as well as signal the
need for federal enforcement efforts.
Finally, and most importantly, the federal statute should specify
protections for consumers in state programs. Regardless of the
status of a program as an entitlement or a categorical grant, states
should be required to serve all those who meet eligibility criteria.
The federal government must provide the requisite funds to en-
able states to meet this obligation comfortably. Additionally,
regardless of the diminished protection of the procedural due
254process doctrine in public programs, states should ensure that
state programs have adequate procedures to enable program bene-
ficiaries to adjudicate disputes and receive needed program
benefits. Finally, ERISA should be amended so that program bene-
ficiaries have comparable remedies including tort remedies against
managed care plans with which states contract to provide bene-
fits. 
2 55
Ideally, a properly structured federal-state program could
achieve real innovation in coverage expansions for vulnerable
groups and break ground for real reform in the health sector gen-
erally. States would then have the flexibility to take the approaches,
such as developing safety net provider networks along the lines of
the approach of the Indiana Commission on Health Care for the
Working Poor, that target and reach those uninsured that are
unlikely to obtain affordable or consistent employer-sponsored
coverage. Such flexibility enables states to capitalize on one of their
greatest assets-familiarity with local conditions and resources.
This flexibility, coupled with the critical federal funding, could do
much to enable states to take the lead in covering those uninsured
Americans who are not now eligible for public health insurance
programs and who are poorly served, if at all, by employer-
sponsored health insurance. 57
254. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 239-50 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 207-32 and accompanying text.
257. See generally Mary E. O'Connell, supra note 39 (describing how employer benefits
do not meet the needs of low-income workers, especially women and the unemployed).
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CONCLUSION
In sum, the legal relationship between states and the federal
government regarding the financing and regulation of health care
is unique, complex, and cumbersome. It must be fundamentally
reformed to enable states to shape the content, scope, and direc-
tion of their health policy. Given the currently dysfunctional
relationship between the Administration and the Congress within
the federal government, state involvement in domestic policy as a
general matter is desirable. The October headlines of the Washing-
258ton Post, quoted above, tell the story. Congress and the President
are locked in partisan battle and are unable or unwilling to act, at
least for the foreseeable future. In this temporary state of federal
dysfunction, states can provide leadership and solutions with re-
form of the federal relationship. In the long run, states have much
to offer in the way of flexibility and expertise in meeting the chal-
lenge of expanding coverage for the uninsured poor and in health
reform generally.
258. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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